Change in motion or more of the same

It is typical for MTC to raise big expectations but then only end up to be more of the same. The so call "Change in Motion" of T2035 is simply another plan to protect funding for highway expansions, commit uncertain funding for the otherwise financial unsustainable BART project, and not address the funding shortfall for everyday transit operations.

MTC is actually quite honest about their move to allocate uncertain and yet-to-be-legislated high occupancy toll lane revenue for the BART project as a way to defraud transit riders and taxpayers in the future:

MTC Executive Director Steve Heminger acknowledged the commission was moving ahead before they had legislation, but saw no problem with it. "I would consider the issue that is before you today in the plan and the placement of the $2B as a placeholder, which is subject to change and probably will change. I will acknowledge that we are jumping the gun to some extent. But I think that's a reasonable planning assumption to make and I don't think it has to prejudice this process. We need to make some kind of commitments now, at least on a provisional basis."

By making this move, MTC is signaling VTA that it is okay for VTA to continue spending money on consultants. When the project becomes "shrovel ready," MTC would then cut other transit projects to make up the actual funding shortfall. For instance, the Warm Springs extension has been on the past RTPs for years because MTC assumed the project would be funded by surplus passenger revenue from the SFO extension. When ridership fell below MTC's expectation and that funding got evaporated, MTC made San Mateo County pay for construction anyway by defunding the Dumbarton Rail project.

MTC and VTA want everyone to believe that they're "surprised" by this economic crisis and that somehow through this plan they don't need to ask for more tax dollars or transit cuts. However their history shows otherwise. Since 2001, they have been trying to make the BART project appear affordable. When they got some money, they would spend more than what they have so they can extort us for more money later by raising taxes and cutting transit projects.

Meanwhile MTC has gotten the justification to expand highways (HOT lanes) and that somehow widening more highways would mean less pollution and less dependence on automobiles.

VTA says it can afford BART to Milpitas without federal funds

In response to the lawsuit filed by TRANSDEF over funding for the Warm Springs extension, VTA submitted documents stating that VTA can afford to build BART from Warm Springs to Milpitas without the use of federal funds. 

TRANSDEF sued Alameda County Transportation Improvement Authority for illegally allocating local sales tax funds for the Warm Springs project because the local sales tax funding for Warm Springs requires a rail connection to Santa Clara County to be "fully funded." In January, VTA board approved a "full funding" plan for an extension to the Flea Market. However that "full funding" plan assumes $750 million from the federal government, which VTA has yet to apply for, and which the funding is not certain.

VTA staff submitted documents in an attempt to justify the project's "fully funded" status. However that document is not a VTA's board approved policy.

According to the document, the extension to Milpitas costs $1.7 billion. After that project along with a few others, VTA would be left with $720 million (in 2007 dollars) in the 2000 Measure A program.

Also according to the recently released EIS for the project, the total cost from Fremont to Berryessa costs $2.49 billion, which translate to a difference of $738 million for portion between Milpitas and Berryessa. In other words, VTA could afford to build to Berryessa if it wants to without federal funds, and that federal funds would actually be meant to go one more stop beyond Milpitas.

Although VTA could proceed without federal funds, VTA would want those funds anyway so they can start collecting the 1/8 cent Measure B sales tax. Last year's Measure B required matching funds from the federal government to start. Even with the federal funds, VTA cannot afford to build the line through downtown, which would cost an additional $4 billion.

The $1.7 billion project, although affordable, is still way overpriced. The line basically costs more than $300 million per mile, which is five times more expensive than Vasona light rail, the last VTA-built project completed in 2005. Despite the much higher cost, the proposed project would be built largely at grade adjacent to an existing freight track like the Vasona line. In addition, the project is also more expensive per mile than the last BART extension to SFO, which is mostly underground.

Furthermore, the difference in cost for going 3 miles from Milpitas to Berryessa could help pay for light rail extension to Eastridge, Caltrain electrification, and possibly light rail along Santa Clara Street.

Transit advocates do not favor BART because of its unreasonably high cost, and this document clearly shows the trade off. Alternatives exist that would provide the same if not better level of service at a much lower cost, but these brand-obsessed delusionals just couldn't get it.

The plan means bus cuts after all

After a series of public meetings on the 2009 service plan, VTA staff made a number of revisions which amounted to bus cuts.

Essentially, staff recommened selected trip reductions on various routes, including significant frequency reductions on lines 31, 45, 64 (on Saturday), and 88.

Under the revised plan, lines 66 and 68 would have improved frequency throughout the day as originally proposed.

The original plan was supposed to be cost neutral, where resources in poor-performing routes would be diverted to corridors that have a greater ridership demand. Because of the budget crisis that VTA is facing, VTA has "deferred" some of the improvements that would be made if all the resources were reallocated. In other words, bus cuts.

Those "deferred" improvements include additional trips on various lines, as well as Saturday service on line 37.

In regards to line 180 and 181 from Fremont, VTA continues to propose expanding 181 operation all-day, but with a 30-minute frequency midday. 180 would only operate between Fremont and the Great Mall every 30 minutes. VTA also proposes to use the Stevenson-I880 routing (as supposed to the current Mission-I680-Mission-I880) as VTA would use the parking lot at the former Fremont City Hall for bus riders. Today, lines 180 and 181 operate every 15 minutes.

Why are all of our predictions correct? Because most members on the VTA Board are delusional and VTA General Manager Michael Burns has failed to provide real leadership. Rather than to educate the public about the real choices ahead for the agency, Burns continued to appease the Downtown Delusionals by give them false hopes as of last Friday:

"The (VTA) board still plans to complete the entire (BART) line," said Burns of the 16.1-mile extension into downtown San Jose's Diridon Station and beyond into Santa Clara. "There's just no sense in building only as far as Berryessa and then putting off finishing the line for another 25 years."

Since 2006, VTA has not provided any financial projections that it has the funds to build the BART line to Santa Clara. Rather, outside consultants have concluded multiple times that the VTA financial projection made in 2006 was unrealistic. In addition, the whole premise to go to Santa Clara is no longer there because VTA and the San Jose Airport cannot afford an airport people mover.

It was especially unethical that Burns made this unfulfillable promise in light of this, and possibly more, bus cuts and fare increases.

If the Downtown Delusionals are disappointed that BART could only go as far as the Flea Market, they only have themselves to blame for believing in Guardino's and Burns' lies, rather than believing in the transit advocates that pushed for more realistic and affordable alternatives.

"Shocked?" "astonished?" ...more like "we told you so!"

At yesterday's VTA board workshop, the boardmembers who naively believed in Michael Burns' words last fall now found themselves "shocked" and "astonished" over the bleak financial projections presented by staff and consultants.

They were also "surprised" to hear that the BART project could only be built in phases. VTA released its updated costs for the BART project, which VTA insisted that it must be withheld from the public before last year's election. Overall, the total cost for the line to Santa Clara has grown to $6.1 billion, which is not escalated to the year of completion, and does not include financing cost.

For us, there's nothing shocking:

Given the results, it is unlikely for voters to approve a third tax for the same project in the next 8 years, if not longer. VTA will have no choice but to build a shorter line (which was never put on the table before by VTA until right after the election) with the funding it already has. At the end, it may not be a win for the downtown delusionals who want nothing but a subway.

And that Guardino and Burns cheated the county taxpayers:

Although it may seem like an outcome of the Measure B vote, the Berryessa segment is actually a project that VTA could undertake without Measure B. VTA intentionally delayed in committing a feasible funding plan so that VTA could pretend that they really need the tax. Perhaps Measure B opponents like Rick DiNapoli and Bill Baron were right that the tax was actually to backfill VTA's inefficient operation.

Michael Burns knows as much as we do, but what he did was that he controlled the flow of information. Before the election, he said that VTA had the money to build the entire BART project but not to run it. Today, he said that VTA could only afford to build the line to Berryessa. Last month, VTA presented a revised operating plan for July that is supposed to keep the same level of transit service with no budget cuts. Now, transit service is on the chopping block. Also in January, Burns asked the VTA board to approve an updated Short Range Transit Plan that has an operating reserve of $50 million, which would continue to grow for years to come. Today, Burns presented a new projection that would eat up all the reserves.

The economy was already in poor shape months before the election. It should be a no-brainer to know that VTA would be in a deep crisis soon. Burns withheld information at the time when voters were deciding whether to trust VTA, and only release bad news when voters no longer matter to VTA.

Surprise stimulus gift to High Speed Rail

Earlier today, the House and Senate settled on a stimulus package that's worth just less than $800 million. On the transit side, the final stimulus package will mirror the version approved by the Senate: $8.4 billion will be distributed to transit agencies based on established formulas and with an additional $5.5 billion to be spent on transit and highway projects selected by the Department of Transportation.

Some expressed disappointments that funding for New Starts projects is not included in the final bill (which was actually included at $750 million, a reduced amount from the house version). Some also thought the stimulus package should include direct operating funds to backfill loss state and local funding.

The biggest surprise is funding for High Speed Rail programs. HSR program was not specifically included in the House version of the bill. Later the Senate added $2 billion. During the conference negotiations, the committee agreed to increase HSR funding to $8 billion. According to reports, the increase was urged personally by President Obama and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid.

The sudden increase in HSR funding can certainly help to accelerate projects. Earlier this week, MTC released a plan on how to spend the stimulus funds. Under MTC's plan, projects that are almost ready to go but lack funding received priority, which included the people mover connection to Oakland Airport and the underground train box at the Downtown San Francisco Transbay Terminal. VTA would also receive stimulus funds on a formula basis to replace aging buses with hybrids.

Some delusionals were quite disappointed that the BART project was not included in the stimulus package. However, that project was not in a position to benefit from the package anyhow. Under the best case scenario, construction would not be ready for another 3-4 years in the minimum, which runs counter to the intent of the stimulus bill: to create jobs soon as a way to recover from the economic slump. Also, the BART system is not compatible with High Speed Rail. Carl Guardino and other VTA boneheads insisted that regional trains and long distance trains cannot share infrastructure, and they actively advocated against sensible proposals like Caltrain Metro East, which would have certainly benefited from the Prop 1A as well as the stimulus package.

Another 880 widening

Appeared on February's VTA Take One newsletter is the announcement that VTA is starting planning work for the new carpool lanes in 880 between Milpitas and San Jose.

With the latest segment between Fremont Blvd and Dixon Landing Road opened last November, the carpool lanes now exist on I-880 between San Leandro to Milpitas. VTA has proposed to reroute the 181 to operate only on I-880 between Fremont and San Jose in July, which would allow buses on the new carpool lanes and not having to switch freeways. However, the major drawback is that VTA needs to identify a park and ride lot along the route for those who want to drive to the bus.

Before 2003, the I-880 between Milpitas and San Jose only had 2 lanes in each direction, which was unusually narrow. Because of the chronic congestion in both directions, 180 buses often rerouted onto Old Oakland Road. Even with the new lanes opened in 2003, the congestion came back eventually. Today, while the northbound 181 buses can run at full speed on the freeway in the afternoon, the congestion in the other direction can still require southbound buses to use Old Oakland Road.

Does it make sense for VTA to spend funds to widen the same freeway again even though it claims to have enough funds (by shortchanging transit projects elsewhere) to build BART to Berryessa? Because of the way VTA segregates transit and highway funds, it is virtually impossible for a transit project to replace a highway project, even through it has occurred elsewhere. Even with light rail in the freeway median, VTA still managed to build new carpool lanes that parallel light rail. VTA's segregation of funds and continuing support for more freeway expansions has and will undercut transit.

Thursday's VTA board meeting

Tomorrow the VTA board plans to approve a "full funding" plan for the BART project. That full funding plan only includes the segment to Berryessa (Flea Market), which is the segment that VTA is trying to obtain federal funding for. That "full funding" plan is necessary to release additional funds in Alameda County needed for BART to build a line from the Fremont station to Warm Springs, in which VTA will pick up construction from there on.

Although it may seem like an outcome of the Measure B vote, the Berryessa segment is actually a project that VTA could undertake without Measure B. VTA intentionally delayed in committing a feasible funding plan so that VTA could pretend that they really need the tax. Perhaps Measure B opponents like Rick DiNapoli and Bill Baron were right that the tax was actually to backfill VTA's inefficient operation. Unfortunately, VTA and SVLG was able to deceive voters into believing that VTA is not involved with Measure B and the BART project. They needed to sucker voters who professed to dislike VTA into giving more money to the same agency.

While VTA is certainly the worst transit agency in the country, and that VTA itself deserves a lot of the disaffection, VTA bus and light rail service is no less valuable than other "glamorous" and "popular" transit like Caltrain and BART, especially for those who are transit dependent. It was wrong for VTA to hide itself to sell a project that it has trouble to complete. We cannot neglect the importance of VTA's service and the struggles everyday VTA riders face.

Short Range Transit Plan

Meanwhile, the VTA board is also set to approve a Short Range Transit Plan at the same meeting. Like the same plan last year, VTA is insisting that they will keep the same level of transit service for the next ten years (another unfulfilled 2000 Measure A promise to increase service) and its wage escalation rate at 3.5%. However, the plan this year assumes lower tax revenues because of the current economic downturn. Somehow, to create an illusion that no cuts would be needed, VTA also lowered its operating cost estimates from last year. Finally, VTA is still attaching the 2000 Measure A expenditure plan that was approved in 2006 on this year's SRTP. The 2006 plan assumed a 1/4 percent tax that voters never approved, and was determined by a VTA consultant to be unworkable.

Things that VTA should have told voters about

At the VTA Board workshop yesterday, General Manager Michael Burns told what a lot of us have been suspected but was denied by the supporters during the Measure B campaign.

"It's clear we can't see the BART project getting ($750 million in federal) money if we're spending our local money on other projects," Burns said in an interview earlier this week. "That just doesn't add up."

During the meeting, VTA also admitted that it would receive $2 billion less from the 2000 Measure A than what was projected earlier.

Basically Burns was saying that all the other projects would be off the table, even the airport people mover, a project that has no operating funds identified. The BRT project along Santa Clara Street, which replaced light rail as originally listed on the 2000 Measure A, is also at risk.

Although some think that the bickering should stop, the bickering will never end as long as VTA has to deploy deceptive tactics to get a tax passed. Burns said that BART was approved by voters twice, but we all know that VTA did not put other projects on the ballot twice for voters to approve. VTA controlled which projects go onto the ballot, controlled how much tax to collect, and controlled what information released relevent to voters. VTA has become a Russian style "democracy."

Given the election results in Los Angeles and the North Bay, VTA could've been better off by being more honest.

Is BART the only thing that voters could ever pass?

In an unprecedented turnout, the yes vote for B barely crept pass 2/3 threshold with the provisional votes. It is unusual because Santa Clara County had a voter turnout of about 70% in 2000 and 2004, but increased by over 15% in just 4 years.

It is a temporary win for the downtown delusionals. As expected, they will say that voters only want BART but not other forms of mass transit, and that somehow VTA can pay for the whole project.

Is that really the case?

• In Los Angeles, voters approved a 1/2 cent sales tax increase for transit by 67.31%.
• In the North Bay, voters approved a 1/4 cent sales tax increase for rail by 69.5%.
• In the East Bay, voters approved a parcel tax for AC Transit operation by 71.9%.

Voters should have easily passed a tax for transit if they actually have confidence in VTA. VTA now only had to rely on voters who don't know about VTA or the tax 8 years ago.

Regardless what the vote margin is, VTA is bound to break its "promise." VTA has not been telling voters how it could build the BART line, or even how much it would cost. In any case, the financial situation will only get tighter with declining state funding and sales tax revenue.

Given the results, it is unlikely for voters to approve a third tax for the same project in the next 8 years, if not longer. VTA will have no choice but to build a shorter line (which was never put on the table before by VTA until right after the election) with the funding it already has. At the end, it may not be a win for the downtown delusionals who want nothing but a subway.

VTA couldn't get BART to say that Measure B would be enough

Besides from the biggest lie that VTA has enough local funding to build the BART project (how do you know when VTA is not releasing updated costs?), the other big lie is that Measure B would provide enough funding to subsidize the operation. According to the Palo Alto Daily Post, new Public Records Act documents obtained by the No on B campaign from BART show that VTA and BART still couldn't agree whether Measure B would be enough after it was placed on the ballot:

"If asked if $42m is enough, I don't believe we are in a position to say yes," wrote BART General Mananger Dorothy Dugger in an Aug. 20 e-mail to VTA head Michael Burns. "Until we have an operating plan we really don't know what the costs are." Burns was asking Dugger for help responding to a statement in the Mercury News that VTA's annual obligation to BART was $48 million, not the $42 million the sales tax hike is estimated to generate.

VTA and BART had differences on operating plans. VTA wanted BART to operate shorter trains to save capital and operating costs. BART did not agree with VTA's plan for shorter trains because BART determines the train length according to the ridership demand between San Francisco and the East Bay. Running shorter trains to accommodate low ridership on the proposed line would cause overcrowding further north.

Michael Burns wanted BART to confirm VTA's flawed estimate, which claims Measure B would be more than enough to subsidize BART operations. Although BART was reluctant to endorse VTA's estimate, BART realized that it is in their interest to see Measure B passed anyhow even if it may mean further cuts into VTA's operation. In response, BART issued a letter stated that VTA's estimate was consistent with the 2001 comprehensive agreement, even though it never tried to answer the critical question of whether Measure B would be enough.

"It means that the VTA board placed a tax measure on the ballot without even knowing what the costs of the project are going to be," said No on B spokeswoman Margaret Okuzumi. "VTA is attempting to obscure this, to hide this, to get some kind of political cover from BART."

It is hard to get fair news coverage these days on this issue. Due to media consolidation and bias, the San Jose Mercury News and its associate local newspapers virtually blacked out most news and comments critical of Measure B. Two weeks ago, with three TV stations covering the press conference held by the No on B campaign, San Jose Mercury News provided zero coverage, even though "reporter" Gary Richards showed up and observed the press conference.

Piecing the puzzle on the true cost

With all the exaggerated claims made by Measure B proponents, they have so far provided nothing to back up their promises.

What the documents obtained through the Public Record Act show is that VTA refused to provide updated cost estimates:

Email from Bena Chang (Yes on B/SVLG operative) to VTA on Friday, 8/22 at 4:58pm :

"Could you answer this question for us? We'll need the answer by Monday, cob. WHAT IS THE COST FOR DESIGN AND BUILD OF THE EXTENSION AND HOW MUCH OF THAT IS FUNDED BY MEASURE A AND OTHER FUNDING SOURCES?"

Reply from Brandi Childress (VTA PR staff) to Chang on Monday, 8/25 at 3:01pm:

"On your second request, staff is actually working on a 2008 Draft 65% Engineering cost...actual costs in 2008 dollars based on the design thus far. Is COB today the drop deadline... in other words, is early tomorrow out of the question? Please advise, thanks!"

Another reply from Jennie Loft (VTA PR staff) to Chang on Monday, 8/25 at 3:37pm:

"We are Working on 2008, 65% engineering costs. It will need to go through review process. What we have now available is 2005, trending engineering costs, which you can have now. Please advise and we can provide. Thanks!"

Later at night, Leyla Hedayat, a VTA planner, sent a message to the VTA PR staff about Chang's questions (8/25 at 11:18pm):

"I received an email this evening to talk to Michael, I will try him first thing tomorrow - I suspect it has do with the cost estimate. We have the trended PE in 2005$ but will not have the 65% cost estimate for tomorrow. They are not finalized and VTA mgmt. has not reviewed these costs. I will give an update at our meeting tomorrow."

Reply from Childress to Phil Yost, another SVLG operative, on Tuesday, 8/26 at 4:19pm:

"..The VTA Exec Team is working on numbers based on 65% design engineering costs but we need to really vet them with Mr. Burns which won't be ready by tomorrow. We also want to make sure we are accurate and ready to run with figures that have not even been released through our Federal environmental or new starts processes yet. Our take is that we would rather be safe than sorry..."

Reply from Childress to Chang on Tuesday, 8/26 at 4:45pm:

"..The cost is $4.7 billion in 2005 dollars. The extension will cost approximately $6 billion in year of expenditure dollars (construction year dollars), projected by year 2017. This figure considers inflation of the dollar and does not mean the cost has increased from $4.7 billion..."

Another message from Hedayat to the VTA PR staff about Chang's questions (8/26 at 10:35pm):

"...Can you make sure that Bena knows that $4.7 Billion is the Preliminary Engineering (35%) estimate. This is important later when the a 65% estimate is released. We should be careful about emphasizing "This figure considers inflation of the dollar and does not mean the cost has increased from $4.7 billion." It is okay to say inflation of the dollar but lets not focus on this does not mean the cost has increased."

Essentially Hedayat admitted that the actual cost (yet to be released) would be much higher than the cost told by the PR staff.

Nearly two months after the email exchanges between SVLG and VTA over the cost of the project, VTA is still officially withholding the updated cost estimates. Soon after the press conference held by the No on B campaign, Michael Burns told KCBS what the No on B campaign has long suspected:

"Burns said the new estimate due early in 2009 would likely be in the $6 billion range, a figure consistent with Okuzumi's projection based on a 30 percent increase in construction costs."

Burns told the media that it would be irresponsible for him to provide new numbers before the work is finished (scheduled to be completed after the election). However, it is actually more irresponsible for him to withhold that information until after the election. Since 2000, VTA has not shown once that it could afford to build the BART project without gutting the rest of the transit system and/or more tax increases. Measure B is just another attempt to mislead voters into believing that VTA could build the BART project cheap.

Besides the outdated figures, VTA also refused to include bonding cost. Numerous studies have indicated that VTA will require billions more in bonding cost to maintain cash flow if it wants to build the entire project in 10 years. VTA could scrap every project it promised earlier, but VTA could not refuse to pay the bonding cost.

Using outdated numbers and omitting bonding cost, Measure B simply would not be enough for VTA to deliver the BART project. However, it would allow VTA to hold back on other transit improvements, if not cutting more of the transit services that we have.

The same false promises with Measure B

One thing that's true in Santa Clara County is that it is almost impossible to have a sincere, rational discussion about transportation. The delusionals are so obsessed about the BART brand that they're forgetting the fact that it is just a very expensive, non-standard train.

Measure B is all about them being delusional. 8 years ago, Carl Guardino at least tried the featherbed the 2000 Measure A with other projects to make it looked more equitable and fair. This time, with all the VTA failures, all they could sell is a BART brand and a BART delusion without mentioning "VTA" and "new tax." (try to search both phases in the article and you'll see.)

With little credibility left, the delusionals are trying to associate the BART project with all the poll-tested, feel-good buzz words of the day.

Reduce dependence on foreign oil? Reduce greenhouse gas emissions? As Scott Herhold wrote earlier, whatever fuel saving benefits are minimal: "By my back-of-the envelope figuring, the proponents' current estimate of 12,000 gallons of gas saved a day is only three-tenths of 1 percent of total Bay Area usage."

By the way, Caltrain already uses more diesel fuel than that everyday. VTA can do more to reduce oil dependence and emissions by spending just a fraction of the cost to electrify Caltrain. Instead, VTA/SVLG continue to delay the project and trying to mislead others by blaming San Francisco.

A full rail car removes 200 cars from the road? The reality is that neither a BART nor a Caltrain car has that much seating capacity. In fact, even with VTA's inflated ridership numbers, one out of three seats would be empty during the morning rush hours between Fremont and Milpitas. Also, more than half of the projected ridership would be diverted from existing buses and trains.

Of course we must not forget that the BART extension to Millbrae has failed to meet ridership projections and nearly bankrupted SamTrans.

One would wonder why these delusionals are hitting us again for another tax. 8 years ago, voters believed Guardino when he declared that the 2000 tax would be more than enough. After all these years, Measure B supporters could have chip in more of their own money if they really believed BART as a worthy form of investment. Instead, what they did was to shift more of the tax burden onto the residents in this county.

In 2003, Carl Guardino flat out rejected a proposal calling for a VTA payroll tax. If the employers wanted BART because it would somehow help them import more cheap labor from the East Bay, shouldn't they pay their fair share? After all, even a VTA-sponsored "economic study" of the BART project has indicated that workers from out-of-county would only spend about 5.7% of their income in Santa Clara County, mostly on their lunches.

Also, since 2005, SVLG has lobbied for legislation to exempt companies from paying sales taxes.

These days, there are too many false promises everywhere. It is time to have a sincere, rational discussion. Only a NO vote will help us get there.

What have we got after 8 years?

After 8 years, driving alone is still the dominant transportation mode in the Valley. In the Bay Area, Santa Clara County ranks the highest on percentage of commuters who drive alone, and among the lowest on the percentage of commuters using transit.

Today, Carl Guardino continues to claim that he's a transit advocate, and that he knows the "missing puzzle piece" that would somehow magically make transit work in the Valley.

A look back in history shows that Guardino and VTA have actively make transit less viable in the county:

In 2000, Carl Guardino and Ron Gonzales conceived a new sales tax to build the BART project. Riding on a bubble economy, they insisted that the sales tax couldn't be delayed and that Measure A would provide "traffic relief now," even though it was clear that BART was at least 10 years away. In the process to rush the tax on the ballot, many stakeholders were left out of the planning process. However, some were appeased when VTA and SVLG included some funding for their pet projects in Measure A, such as a study of a BART extension from Santa Clara to Palo Alto. Even so, VTA General Manager Pete Cipolla warned the board that Measure A wouldn't provide enough money to operate all Measure A projects through the life of the tax.

Later in October, in the middle of the 2000 Measure A campaign, VTA suddenly came out with a new sales tax revenue projection that claimed it has all the money needed to operate all the Measure A expansions.

In the meantime, VTA successfully sabotaged a fully funded Caltrain connection between San Jose and BART in Union City. VTA claimed it dropped the project because of opposition from Fremont, but the reality is that VTA could not afford to have a viable rail alternative in place while pursuing this overpriced "missing puzzle piece."

After the passage of Measure A, VTA began to reduce bus and light rail service. Initially VTA claimed shortage of drivers and light rail construction as reasons for cut backs, but those excuses gave way to actual tax revenue downturn as the bubble economy bursted.

Worried about the revenue downturn would impact that "missing puzzle piece," SVLG led a "business review team" that recommended huge fare increases and service cuts to seniors and the disabled in 2002:

"Under the current proposals, seniors and disabled riders will see the largest fare increases across-the-board - with costs for rides and passes doubling in some cases - as well as some reduced service.

"But those changes would come off the top of historically 'deep, deep' discounts and enhanced levels of paratransit service that are above Americans With Disabilities Act mandates, said VTA spokeswoman Lupe Solis."

These recommendations caused riders to leave VTA and did not significantly improve VTA's farebox recovery rates.

As the tax revenue declined further in 2003, VTA threatened a 21% transit cut. After months of protests by transit riders and workers, VTA reluctantly accepted a proposal to bond against the 2000 Measure A tax revenue to fill the revenue shortfall. If that 21% transit cut were implemented, line 180 would only operate between Fremont and light rail in north San Jose. Riders heading to and from downtown San Jose would have to transfer to light rail. VTA would like everyone to believe it was all because of the economy,but it was really more than that:

"By November 2002, the economic nosedive combined with skyrocketing costs for the BART extension had combined to create a $6 billion operating shortfall during VTA’s 25 year planning horizon.

"On November 8, 2002, a majority of VTA board members directed staff to develop a few balanced, or “live within your means,” budgets. VTA staff responded the next month with three scenarios for balancing the agency’s budget. The first scenario was still not balanced, with expenses exceeding revenues so greatly as to ultimately lead the agency to bankruptcy. The third scenario was simply infeasible. The only long-term balanced scenario required cutting 70% of VTA’s bus services and abandoning all planned expansions except two: BART to San Jose and East Valley Light Rail."

Responding to the funding shortfall, VTA convened an ad-hoc Financial Stability Committee to explore additional options to address the problem. One of the committee findings is that VTA was too reliant on sales tax revenue, which was considered to be too volatile. Some committee members suggested a new 1% payroll tax like the one in San Francisco. Because a payroll tax would hit squarely on the employers, Carl Guardino quickly rejected it:

"Carl Guardino said a 1 percent payroll tax would average roughly $1,000 per employee annually - a heavy burden on struggling companies."

As always, he prefers sales taxes, which are regressive and hit people who don't earn an income. SVLG has also advocated bills to exempt high tech companies (its member companies) from paying sales taxes on certain taxable purchases.

Meanwhile in 2003, because of the widening of 101 between San Jose and Morgan Hill (lobbied by SVLG in 1996 as a part of the 1996 sales tax plan) along with a fare increase recommended by VTA, Caltrain ridership south of San Jose dropped dramatically. The ridership continued to decline years after the freeway widening, even as the rest of the Caltrain system experienced ridership increases because of the Baby Bullet.

Three years later in 2006, because SVLG worried that a county general sales tax increase would render another VTA sales tax unwinnable, SVLG made backroom deals resulted in the 2006 Measure A. Even though that sales tax could not legally specify any projects, VTA pursued a parallel process in drafting an expediture plan that would use half of the county's new tax revenue. Fortunately voters saw through the backroom deals and rejected it.

Undeterred, soon after the defeat of the 2006 tax, VTA approved an unbalaced and unworkable expenditure plan and kept continue to waste funds on that "missing puzzle piece." It was clear that VTA would pursue another tax in the next two years. Last year, VTA and SVLG lobbied Sacramento to pass a law permitting VTA to put 1/8 cent sales tax increases on the ballot, which resulted in Measure B.

To this day, VTA is still unwilling to produce a balanced spending plan to finance that so-called "missing puzzle piece." Nonetheless, as much as they try to ignore it, we already know a lot about Measure B: Is Measure B the only tax needed to build BART? Absolutely not! Is Measure B be enough for BART's ongoing costs? Absolutely not! Will Measure B threaten other VTA priorities like Downtown East Valley and Caltrain? Absolutely!

To make transit work in this Valley, what we need is not the "missing puzzle piece." What we need is a changed VTA with new priorities. Instead of focusing on contractors, consultants, and downtown delusionals looking for financial benefits, VTA should focus on riders first, who have already suffered from years of service cuts and fare increases. Over the years, Carl Guardino has been nothing but a negative influence on VTA by lobbying for policies that were against riders' interest. VTA, including the General Manager Michael Burns, has also failed to serve riders' interest by continuing to justify and support flawed policies.

Measure B is a summation and a continuation of the past failed policies of the last 8 years. No wonder why Santa Clara County has made little if any progress in getting more people out of their cars all this time. Only a rejection of Measure B, C, and D will send a clear message to the VTA. Like the rest of the Bay Area, transit priorities ought to be planned openly by the entire community, not by Carl Guardino with his secret polls. We cannot continue to allow SVLG to be the political wing of VTA.

Guardino robs everyone to pay for his pet project

In an effort orchestrated to promote Measure B, the California Transportation Commission plans to allocate $239 million to backfill whatever VTA wasted on the BART project. Gary Richards, as biased as usual, neglected to mention that Carl Guardino, the brainchild of Measure B, sits on the CTC. How could the timing be more perfect to create an illusion that VTA could afford BART?

Guardino and SVLG will do whatever they can before the election to create that illusion. The only news that they will withhold until after the election is the ugly reality of further transit cuts. 7 years ago, just 5 months after the 2000 Measure A passed, VTA announced its first transit cut.

Rather than a real "momentum" as the MTC spokeperson claimed, it is just another zero-sum game, like the diversion of funds from the Dumbarton Caltrain extension. An ugly reality is that the Bay Area just lost $238 million in transit funds this year alone because of the state budget crisis. With the current state of the economy, expect further cuts in transit funds in the years to come.

Other than that Guardino scored political points to deceive voters, what has the Bay Area really gained?

VTA approves placing 1/8 cent sales tax increase on the ballot

With David Casas,Yoriko Kishimoto and Don Gage dissenting, the rest of the VTA board approved the proposal to place the 1/8 sales tax increase on the ballot to pay for the BART extension.

This is a great sample of how dysfunctional the VTA Board is and how most of the board members, already deeply delusional, forget their fiduciary responsibility.

On Monday, VTA General Manager Michael Burns sent a last-minute memo to the boardmembers stating that the proposed 1/8 cent sales tax not only would completely cover the cost of running the BART extension but would produce a surplus. This was a 100% flip-flop over his earlier statement to the press that the 1/8 cent tax would not cover the entire cost.

The memo appeared convincing at the first glance, but BayRail Alliance issued a counter-memo at the meeting showing that Burn's memo left out key details and that the 1/8 tax will only cover about 80% of the cost running the extension.

The key details left out of the Burn's memo are:

• VTA is obligated to pay BART in advance at $48 million per year (in 2001 dollars) and adjusted quarterly thereafter to the growth rate of the sales tax revenue. In other words, BART gets a percentage cut of the sales tax revenue from VTA. That percentage cut happens to be larger than the 1/8 cent sales tax. As a result, the 1/8 cent tax will never completely cover VTA's financial obligation to BART.

• According to the agreement between BART and VTA, VTA's maximum payment on the capital reserve is 30% of the operating and maintenance cost along with the allocated overhead cost. Burn's memo claimed that VTA is obligated to the maximum of the 20% of the operating cost, which, according to the agreement, is actually the minimum payment after 15 years of operation. Unless the advance payment from VTA and fare revenue can completely cover the operating cost plus a 30% capital reserve, BART will not return any funds back to VTA. Calculations by BayRail show that the maximum BART subsidy, which includes a 30% capital reserve, will exceed the $48 million annual advance payment from VTA. Therefore, surplus is not possible.

When Kishimoto pressed Burns about the advance payment, Burns said that VTA is not committed to the $48 million but rather the operating cost, a concept that violates the agreement between BART and VTA.

In response to the BayRail's numbers, Burns pointed out that the tax would be collected years before opening, which would produce a surplus in the early years. Even so, a simple calculation shows that VTA would still leave a deficit of about $200 million under the BayRail scenario, assuming that VTA would not use any of the funds in other ways, which is very unlikely.

Instead of asking hard questions, reviewing VTA's financial obligation to BART, and figuring how this tax relates to other VTA projects like Downtown East Valley, most of the boardmembers were instead telling stories about their delusions. Carl Guardino deliberately rushed this tax at the last minute directly to the board to avoid serious discussions and analysis, especially at the committee level.

Unfortunately, the same carelessness displayed by most boardmembers tonight have led to budget crises at the agency in the past eight years. Does VTA deserve more of your tax dollars? The choice is clear in November.

VTA 1/8 cent tax proposal and more

Without providing an expenditure plan, the VTA Board will consider next week placing a 1/8 cent sales tax increase on the ballot for the BART extension at the request "of a coalition of business, labor, environmental, academic and civic leaders." It is more like Carl Guardino wrote the memo and the ballot measure for VTA by himself, based on his private polling results that he refuses to share with the public.

Also without any analysis, VTA claims that the tax would generate enough funds "to fulfill VTA’s obligation to BART," which is not true. VTA General Manager Michael Burns has admitted that even with the tax, there's still a shortfall of $8 million every year. That shortfall would only cover the minimum payment for BART; however, VTA will actually be responsible for all of the operating subsidies on that extension, including when BART unilaterally increases its operating costs and when ridership fails to meet projection.

In addition, this proposal has not been discussed in any of the VTA standing or advisory committees prior to next week's VTA Board meeting. While it is obvious that Carl Guardino does not want any public participation in the drafting of this tax measure, it is something that the state auditors recommend: "Reviewing work plans for advisory committees to ensure the committees have an opportunity to review and provide input on issues in the early stages of development."

Even without sufficient funds, the VTA board is asked to reaffirm its commitment to the light rail extension from Alum Rock to Eastridge at the same meeting. Apparently, the Downtown East Valley Policy Advisory Board got disturbed by Michael Burn's quote in the San Jose Mercury News suggesting that the light rail extension could be deferred due to lack of funds. San Jose Vice Mayor Dave Cortese sent a memo to VTA reminding the agency that the 2000 Measure A was not all about BART (contrary to Carl Guardino) and that it is time for East San Jose's turn to get a light rail extension.

Although this project has entered into final design and is almost ready to build, the ususal VTA argument for spending prioritization (project readiness) will likely not apply. The problem lies the fact that VTA still operates under an old expenditure plan that assumes a new 1/4 cent sales tax, something which was criticized by the state audit released yesterday. Regardless of VTA's "commitment" to the project, the 1/8 cent sales tax pushed by Guardino will provide nothing for the light rail extension. If Dave Cortese truly believes that it is "unfathomable" for VTA to ask for a tax increase yet trying to take away this project, Cortese should vote against the proposed 1/8 cent sales tax.

Obviously, this light rail extension is useless without a light rail line to downtown via Alum Rock and Santa Clara. Without that portion, the ride from Eastridge to Downtown will take more than twice as long as the buses do today. The biggest barrier other than funding for light rail on Alum Rock and Santa Clara is the BART extension.

What weaknesses do VTA and SVLG have to hide?

An article appeared on this week's Metro exposes the lack of certainty on VTA's part to complete the BART project.

We know that an 1/8 cent tax will not be enough to cover the minimum cost to operate BART, so where would the rest of the money come from? If you think VTA's General Manager Michael Burns knows the answer, he doesn't.

"Even the general manager for VTA says the cost to run BART through the South Bay is a moving target, " according to that article.

If VTA even contemplates cutting service or deferring other projects to fund BART, these conversations need to take place before VTA places the tax on the ballot, rather than after the election. Voters need to have a clear picture of what the risks are. So far, not only VTA has not provided any evidence that VTA can keep its words, VTA also relied on SVLG's private polls so that voters won't know what are VTA's weaknesses. Instead of correcting its weaknesses as a way to build public confidence, VTA chose to hide those from the voters.

GM Burns' response to Scott Herhold's column

Last Sunday, the 2001 agreement between BART and VTA was brought up on Scott Herhold's column. One of the issues discussed is the lien BART will have on the TDA funds (a 1/4 sales tax collected by the state) that VTA currently spends on bus and light rail operation, if VTA cannot identify another funding source (a new tax) to operate the BART extension by 2009.

According to his column, some suggested that the tax is a way to fund VTA through the back door. They argued that VTA could still fund BART with its existing taxes by making VTA operate more efficiently.

Today, in an email message, VTA's GM Michael Burns shot back. Burns wrote that VTA is facing raising cost and that the federal government will never fund BART if VTA had to cut existing services.

There are some truths in what they said, but they are also wrong in some respects.

Rising fuel cost is impacting VTA's budget. Even with the growing ridership, it is hard to imagine that additional fare revenue will keep up with the increasing fuel expenses. At the same time, the state is cutting back funding to public transportation as it tries to resolve its budget deficit. VTA does not have the kind of reserve to fund BART.

At the same time, the 1/8 cent tax will not be able to fund BART without putting a substantial risk on existing bus and light rail operation. VTA has admitted that the 1/8 tax will not completely cover the upfront payment to BART. Also, if the extension fails to meet ridership projection (which it won't), VTA would have to pay more to BART on top of that upfront payment. Under such scenario, VTA not only would have an incentive to cut transit service to fund BART by reducing its expenses, but also by forcing its bus riders to pay more on BART.

In addition, VTA has yet to release an expenditure plan, which would provide clues as to how VTA could borrow enough funds to support a massive construction in downtown San Jose (especially given the construction timetable), along with other commitments like Caltrain, light rail and bus rapid transit throughout the county. Just talking about the operating cost is an attempt to whitewash the risks VTA would face. Will this be the last time VTA ask for a tax increase if it passes? Or will this be one of many times VTA ask taxpayers for a bailout?

The cat is out of the bag

Finally the cat is out of the bag. VTA intends to place a 1/8 cent tax on the November ballot just for the BART extension. The proponents say the tax won't kick in until VTA receives other matching funds from the state and the federal government.

Regardless of when VTA would actually receive matching funds, a new tax (short of what VTA says it needs) would certainly put local bus and paratransit service in jeopardy.

Remember when VTA proposed a 21% transit reduction in 2003? It will happen again if this tax were to go forward.

VTA to host meeting on Downtown East Valley

VTA has released a draft environmental impact report on the Santa Clara-Alum Rock corridor project. Eight years ago, light rail on the that corridor was one of the key projects listed on the 2000 Measure A in order to woo voters. Now it has been watered down to a bus rapid transit project with a possibility of a light rail upgrade.

For the BRT, VTA proposes to operate the existing 522 and the new 523 from downtown to Eastridge along Santa Clara/Alum Rock and then Capitol Expressway. On Santa Clara/Alum Rock west of King, buses will run on the curbside lane with upgraded bus stops that extend to the traffic lane. East of King, buses will run on the median bus lanes to Capitol Avenue. On Capitol Avenue, buses will operate pretty much as it is. VTA estimates a 25 minute travel time between Eastridge and San Jose Diridon Station.

Even if the light rail extension from Alum Rock to Eastridge (approved as a separate project, but unfunded) goes forward, buses will continue to serve Eastridge according to the study. However, the EIR has suggested that VTA could defer that project.

As for the light rail alternative, it is similar to the BRT proposal in various ways. It will share lanes with street traffic west of King and have reserved right of way east of King. The light rail alternative has an estimated travel time of a 27 minutes between San Jose Diridon Station and Eastridge, 90 seconds longer than the BRT. VTA says light rail could not be built at least until 2018, when BART is supposed to be completed. Also in the EIR, VTA threw out the idea of putting light rail underground (just like BART) because of the obvious high cost.

Essentially, as long as BART is on the table, light rail is dead on the Santa Clara/Alum Rock corridor. Even though light rail construction could technically move forward once BART construction completes, the reality is that VTA will run out of money by then and it will instead cut local bus service on that corridor to force riders onto BART. Whatever assumptions about the operating plan in the EIR should be taken with a grain of salt.

Although BRT is a good, cost-effective plan worthy of consideration, a switch from light rail to BRT nonetheless represents a pattern of double standards. If VTA actually put as much effort to develop a cost-effective alternative to BART as it did for light rail on the Santa Clara/Alum Rock Corridor, VTA wouldn't have to ask voters for another tax increase this November.

VTA has scheduled a meeting on Thursday to receive feedback on the proposal:

Thursday, July 17, 2008 at 6 p.m.
(presentation begins at 6:30 p.m.)
Mexican Heritage Plaza, Green Room
1700 Alum Rock Avenue
San Jose, CA 95116